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Chapter 6 
The business of governorship: Corporate elitism in public education 
Andrew Wilkins 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I examine the role and ideology of corporatism and the image of the corporation as a 
dominant policy technology guiding different aspects of school governance in England.  Corporatism can be 
broadly defined as the development of a distinct economic-instrumental rationality captured through the 
generation of specific forms and means of producing technical knowledge or ‘know-how’ which are 
coterminous with risk-based approaches to regulation and with the strategic deployment or retention of 
resources – human and non-human – in the pursuit of efficiency, profit and certain measurable ‘outcomes’.  
Corporatism also requires certain techniques, shared values, social relations and practices to predominate 
over others in order for the above conditions to be made legitimate and desirable.  This is because, under 
corporate ideology, means can always be justified where they are they commensurate with the fulfilment 
of certain ends, and therefore value differences or value divergences tend to be regarded as risky business.  
In this chapter I consider the extent to which corporate strategies are evident in the kinds of everyday work 
engaged with and produced by agents of school governance, namely school governors.  Moreover, I 
consider whether ‘corporate elitism’, rather than corporate elites per se, is implicit to decisions concerning 
who and why certain people get to enter governance roles.   
 For well over six hundred years governors in England have played an essential role as the ‘custodians’, 
‘stewards’ and ‘wardens’ of schools, in essence bringing judgements to bear upon the ‘performance’ or 
‘quality’ of schools as publicly accountable institutions.  Governors refer to parent, staff and community 
volunteers who are either elected or co-opted to their position and who have traditionally occupied a lay 
role as ‘critical friends’ to the leaders and managers of schools. Today however that role is changing 
significantly and increasingly governors find themselves being trained and responsibilised in new ways that 
mirror elements of corporate aspirations and principles.  Central to the reform of governing bodies in 
England at this time, and their complete disbandment in some cases (Coughlan 2016), is the promotion of 
risk-based approaches to regulation which seek to subordinate the work of governors to a strict corporate 
focus on financial probity, internal auditing, compliance-checking, and risk absorption.  These reforms have 
produced cultures of school governance that are increasingly ‘corporate’ rather than ‘charitable’ or political.  
To be more specific, those forms of charitable giving (or volunteering) that underpin school governance 
have been coopted to serve a myriad of corporate ends (see Wilkins 2016).  To evidence these trends I draw 
on evidence taken from a three-year research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) (Grant Ref. ES/K001299/1, 2012-2015) to highlight the movement by which governing bodies in 
England are undergoing change in response to wider, structural reforms linked to disintermediation and 
decentralisation, and related, internal pressures linked to the necessity for governors to performance 
manage themselves and senior school leaders.   
 
When we consider the different actors and knowledge that have come to influence forms of policy making 
and enactment in England, from philanthropic organisations (Ball 2008) and consultants (Gunter, Hall and 
Mills 2014) to school business managers (Woods 2014) and policy innovation labs (Williamson 2015), 
governors can be conceptualised in similar ways as central figures in the ‘modernisation’ and 
‘corporatisation’ of state education. 
 
Creeping corporatisation 
 
Over the last five years there has been an unprecedented acceleration in the number of academies and free 
schools to open in England.  Unlike ‘maintained’ or ‘community’ schools overseen by locally-elected 
politicians and state-employed bureaucrats, academies and free schools, better known as ‘state-funded 
independent schools’, possess certain freedoms and flexibilities over the running of the school.  This 
includes making decisions about budget spending, curriculum and pedagogy, staff pay and conditions, and 
length of school day.  According to statistics released by the Department for Education (DfE) in June 2015 
(DfE 2015a), 4679 secondary and primary schools have converted to academy status, 1404 schools have 
opened as academies under the guidance of a corporate sponsor and 201 schools are in the process of 
converting to academy status.  Recent statistics also indicate 154 free schools have opened since 2010 (DfE 
2015b).  Identical to academies, free schools are granted powers to operate outside the politics and 
bureaucracy of local government, albeit on the agreement that those powers are exercised responsibly and 
not contrary to the public interest.  Central government therefore appears relaxed about schools operating 
outside of local government control so long as those schools are sufficiently ‘modernised’ and mirror the 
kinds of arrangements found in corporate settings where continuous improvement is managed through 
self-monitoring, risk assessment, performance evaluation, budget control, succession planning, target 
setting, and the like.   
 
At the same time, central government appears anxious that many schools are not populated by the kinds 
of people who are capable or willing to remake their governing body in the image of the corporate board.  
Hence the government is keen for schools to be taken over by an academy chain or ‘Multi-Academy Trust’ 
(MAT) as ‘sponsor academies’.  These schools are governed by a single board of trustees who employ teams 
of experts from education, finance, CPD training, information technology and human resources to improve 
and monitor quality of provision.  In cases where schools are academies but not part of a chain (sometimes 
called a ‘converter academy’), central government intends for those schools to be monitored internally by 
bands of experts or ‘professionals’ so that performance management of senior school leaders is forensic 
and stringent in the absence of local government intervention (Wilkins 2015, 2016).  This has implications 
over who is included and excluded from the business of school governance.  
 
In 2014 I interviewed a group of governors who were overseeing the development of a new free school in 
a very affluent area of London.  The journey from free school application to school opening was a testing 
time for the governors.  To support their case for a free school the governors were involved in running 
public meetings, attending community events, writing articles in the local press, utilising social media, 
developing a website and holding regular steering groups and advisory meetings with legal experts, 
curriculum specialists, governance advisers, local authority officials and senior leaders and teachers from 
some of the local primary schools that would later act as feeder schools to the proposed free school.  As 
one of the governors of the free school, Gill, remarked at the time 
 
It’s fair to say it’s a relatively middle-class governing body and with the skills.  One of the things I 
always think about with the free schools thing is the sense that it could happen in any community 
just isn’t true.  You do have to have the perfect storm of people with the right sort of skills and 
some available free time and not every community has got that actually. 
 
Free schools were launched in 2010 to enable groups of parents, teachers, private organisations and 
charities to open schools in areas where there was evidence of 'need'.  The caveat to these arrangements 
is that a free school application to the DfE requires all kinds of social, economic and cultural capital for it to 
be successful.  It is therefore not surprising to learn that the majority of free school applications are not 
submitted by groups of parents but by head teachers and middle managers, private schools, faith 
organisations, educational management trusts and philanthropic organisations (Higham 2013), namely 
persons and organisations with sufficient resources, expertise and contacts to demonstrate capacity and 
capability as school proposers.  Recently the DfE have requested that free school applicants provide 
evidence of ‘necessary experience and credentials to deliver the school to opening’ (DfE 2015c: 2), such as 
‘access to individuals with specific and sufficient time commitments and relevant experience in…managing 
school finances, leadership, project management, marketing [and] human resources’ (ibid: 24).  Funded by 
the DfE and advocate of free schools, the New Schools Network (NSN) makes the point that ‘The most 
successful Free School groups are those with a diverse range of individuals, skills and contacts’.  
 
During 2012 when I was conducting fieldwork the above free school was halfway through its first year of 
opening.  It was therefore a very busy time for the governors, many of whom were preparing school policy 
documents for ratification, outlining the terms of reference for different committees, conducting a skills 
audit of the governing body, embedding quality controls to enhance long-term sustainability, setting targets 
according to Ofsted-approved benchmarks, monitoring pupil premium spending, commissioning 
consultants to carry out external evaluations, designing and implementing delegation of authority, 
outsourcing contracts to private bidders, perfecting the use of data coding and tracking instruments, 
generating business links and sponsorship, hiring new staff, and scoping premises for a new school building.  
This level of administration, oversight and strategic design is now typical of the ‘corporate work’ performed 
by many governing bodies in England today, especially those functioning outside of local government 
control and with responsibility for the financial and educational performance of the school.  But the above 
governing body was not exactly typical. 
 
Unlike schools situated in deprived, low-income areas where co-opted governors tend to be bused in from 
outside the immediate area, the governors at this particular school reflected the local community where 
the average house price is £1 million.  Among the governing body were members of the professional and 
managerial class, specifically people with skills and experience in marketing, communications, business 
development, accountancy, town planning, investment funding, project management and advertising.  The 
types of creative, strategic work undertaken by these governors were suggestive of people who are mobile, 
calculative, tech-savvy and business-driven.  There were elements of entrepreneurship to how these 
governors conducted themselves and their approach to governing schools.  In many ways their actions 
echoed and redeemed elements of the corporate world, namely people who view problems as challenges 
and opportunities and who adopt a positive attitude to change and risk taking.  And it is precisely these 
kinds of people that the government wishes to see populating governing bodies at this time.  As the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Schools, Lord Nash, argued during his speech to the Independent 
Academies Association (IAA) in 2013, 
 
I’m certainly not opposed to parents and staff being on the GB [governing body], but people should 
be appointed on a clear prospectus and because of their skills and expertise as governors; not 
simply because they represent particular interest groups…Running a school is in many ways like 
running a business, so we need more business people coming forward to become governors. (GUK 
2013) 
 
Remaking school governance 
 
As Sallis (1988) shows, governors – the principal agents of school governance – can be traced back over six 
hundred years to the Winchester School in 1382 where their primary responsibility was to scrutinise the 
teaching and progress of schools with a view to attesting the ‘quality’ of provision and giving some 
assurance to the funders of the school on matters of financial probity and continuity of vision.  During this 
time however schools were either maintained and funded by religious organisations (in the case of charity 
schools) or privately funded by town or city corporations by means of endowment or subscription (in the 
case of public schools and independent schools, which were limited to the most privileged or ‘deserving 
poor’).  This meant that school governance, or ‘stewardship’ and ‘trusteeship’ as it was known then, was 
voluntary for the majority of schools except for those schools in receipt of public subsidy (grammar and 
charity schools specifically).  The 1902 Education Act was therefore significant for the development of 
school governance to the extent it shifted power away church authorities and towards state-centered 
control driven by county and county borough councils introduced in 1888.  Up until this point the notion of 
‘individual schools, individually governed’ (Kogan et al. 1984: 3) was therefore commonplace within the 
English school system, albeit realised in different ways and sometimes not realised at all due to the 
resistance among some school boards and city authorities to delegate powers to a body of governors.  It 
wasn’t until the 1970s that power began to shift towards governors. 
 
Against the backdrop of a diminishing post-war ‘rationing culture’ and the changing expectations of 
burgeoning ‘consumer culture’, public discourse on the role of parents in education was changing.  In 
England and the United States in particular, ‘parents were pressing for increased decentralization of 
educational decision-making to local community school boards’ (Kogan et al. 1984: 5).  A key turning point 
in the development of school governance came in 1975 with the organisation of a Committee of Enquiry 
organised under the chairmanship of Tom Taylor (later Lord Taylor of Blackburn) and the then Secretary of 
State for Education.  The outcome of this enquiry was the publication of the committee’s report, A New 
Partnership for Our Schools (Taylor 1977), which recommend among other things the duty of local 
authorities to delegate powers to governors and for governors to exercise those powers on their behalf.  
These recommendations would not be fully realised until the introduction of the Education Act 1980 and 
more importantly the Education Act 1986 which sought to overturn politicised nomination procedures by 
granting schools freedom to co-opt members to the governing body.  Schools were also permitted at this 
time to opt out of local authority control and become independent planners and managers of their services 
in the role of grant-maintained schools.  Take the example of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) introduced 
under the terms of the Education Reform Act 1988 and the Local Management of Schools.  These schools 
operated outside the purview of local authority control to enable the maximum delegation of financial and 
managerial responsibilities to the governing body (Whitty, Edwards and Gewirtz 1993). 
 
As Sallis (1988: 137) shows, the structure of feeling among many head teachers, teachers and local 
authorities at the time was that the Education Act 1986 represented ‘attacks on local authority 
independence, teacher status and morale, and free and fair schooling for children’.  However, Sallis (1988: 
137) goes on to argue that the Education Act 1986 ‘affords opportunities to strengthen the concept of local 
responsibility, enhance teacher status and morale and restore free and fair schooling for children’.  For 
example, the Education Act 1980 strengthened the notion of a stakeholder model of school governance by 
confirming the statutory right of parents to be elected as governors.  Contradictory forces were also at work 
during this time.  In 1987 the then Conservative government introduced a national curriculum, in effect 
centralising state power and removing the responsibilities of governors to shape the curriculum.  What this 
amounted to was less local authority interference but more centralisation of state power.  As Dean et al. 
(2007: 3) argue, ‘In recent years (effectively since the 1988 Education Reform Act), the degree of direct 
control from central government has increased, at least for state schools, while the degree of local authority 
control has declined.  The majority of schools, therefore, have gained a high level of independence of action, 
but only within a highly prescriptive framework of national regulation’.   
 
Devolved management 
 
Following these trends the then New Labour government introduced academies in 2000 which were 
originally designed to offer ‘radical and innovative challenges to tackling educational disadvantage’ (DfES 
2005) among under-performing schools in disadvantaged urban areas.  Academies in effect constituted the 
wholesale expansion of CTCs established in 1988 under the then Conservative government.  The basic legal 
model for CTCs (state-funded and privately run pursuant to a contract with the Secretary of State) is the 
same model for academies today, albeit funding agreements for academies post 2010 are variable (Wolfe 
2013).  This includes free schools introduced by the Conservative-led government in 2010 which, similar to 
the legal setup of academies, operate under conditions of devolved management as public-private hybrid 
organisations: state-funded schools operating outside local authority control and run by private sponsors 
and academy chains, or in small number of cases local parents and teachers.  While there is nothing about 
these reforms to suggest something new about the trajectory of English education policy over the last 30 
years, the scale and pace of these reforms is undoubtedly something very new.  Consider that New Labour 
opened 3 academies in September 2002 and 14 academies in 2003 and 2004 combined.  As architect of the 
academies programme, Lord Andrew Adonis, recalls, ‘the tipping point came with Tony Blair’s commitment 
in July 2004 to establish at least 200 academies’ (2012: xiii).  Between September 2002 and May 2010, New 
Labour oversaw the creation of 210 academies in England (BBC 2012).  The accelerated pace of these 
reforms occurred in May 2010 when, under the instruction of the Conservative-led government, new 
legislation was rolled out making it possible for all good and outstanding schools to become academies. 
 
Subsequent to these reforms under-performing schools were systematically targeted by the government 
for academy conversion or ‘improvement’.  In some cases schools were forcibly converted under the 
instruction of government-employed ‘academy brokers’ (Holehouse 2013).  In tandem with these trends 
has been increased ‘disintermediation’, namely ‘the withdrawal of power and influence from intermediate 
or ‘meso-level’ educational authorities that operate between local schools and national entities’ (Lubienski 
2014: 424).  However, the diminishing capacity of local authorities to intervene as key middle-tier players 
in the organisation, delivery and monitoring of education services does not necessarily mean a missing 
middle but rather a shift towards public-private partnerships in which the ‘informal authority of networks 
supplements and supplants the formal authority of government’ (Rhodes 2007: 1247).  These trends reflect 
the creation of a heterogeneous, intermediary space occupied by different voluntary and private actors and 
organisations, including ‘local authorities, teaching school alliances, federations, chains and partnerships, 
the National College, private companies and other school improvement initiatives’ (Hill 2012: 22).  As I will 
go on to show, governors also occupy a key role in this space.  
 
The hollowing out and re-populating of the middle therefore represents ‘a shift away from formal local 
government structures and institutions as the principal locus of policy shaping and service delivery to what 
has become known as local governance’ (Atkinson 2012: 40).  Also known as cooperation, co-governance 
or co-management, these trends denote a shift from government to governance, from a ‘logic of structures’ 
(defined by hierarchies and top-down bureaucracy) to a ‘logic of flows’ (defined through interdependence 
between organisations and interactions between network members) (Lash 2002: vii).  It can also be read 
‘as the latest in a dishonourable history of strategies of “depoliticization” of politics that attempt to conceal 
the problems and conflicts of politics behind an appeal to forms of knowledge and varieties of technical 
expertise’ (Clarke 2008: 142).  But to say these trends represent the removal of political control and 
influence over strategic decisions would be misleading.  New forms of political control intended to guide 
the actions of others are evident through the rise of a performance culture among governors (Wilkins 2016).   
 
Under new inspection guidelines introduced by the school’s inspectorate, Ofsted in 2012, school 
governance is now considered integral to both school leadership and school improvement, so much so that 
governors are judged by Ofsted on how effectively they hold senior school leaders to account for the 
financial and educational performance of the school.  Recent announcements and statutory guidance from 
the Department for Education (DfE 2013) and the school’s inspectorate, Ofsted (2011) also highlight the 
key responsibilities to be undertaken by governors, which include providing scrutiny of direction, enabling 
strategy and ensuring accountability.  As I will go on to show, the primary role of governors at this time is 
to produce schools that are intelligible to the funders and to the regulatory body as self-sustaining, expert-
handled, performance-driven, ‘high-reliability’ organisations.  This means that governors are required as 
condition of their role to internalise and perform certain attitudes and orientations taken to be vital to 
‘strong governance’, namely rigorous checks and balances weighted and assessed against set targets and 
long-term goals.  These corporate sensibilities or corporate elitism not only provide the ground logic or 
deeper frames guiding the day-to-day activities of governors.  They also set limits on what it means to 
govern and who is ‘fit for purpose’ in terms of supporting the realisation of these aims in practice. 
 
The data presented in this chapter is taken from a three-year research project funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) (Grant Ref. ES/K001299/1).  A key focus of the project concerned the 
changing role and responsibilities of governors under recent education reforms and the necessity for 
governors under conditions of devolved management to enhance corporate, contract and performative 
measures of accountability.  Data included over 100 interviews with head teachers, senior school leaders, 
school business managers and governors together with 42 observations of governing body meetings. 
 
Risky business 
 
It is evident from the way many governing bodies conduct themselves today, especially with the roll back 
of local government and the roll out of devolved management, that financial probity is key to strong 
governance: 
 
They [governors] have to make sure the money’s right…they didn’t tell me how to run a thirteen 
million pound turnover business, and some of the guys in there have run thirteen million, so there 
is that level of making sure that that works…in the end as an academy there isn’t a nice big local 
authority behind you if you don’t make the budget balance and you can’t afford to pay your staff 
in July.  (Christopher, Head teacher, Child’s Hill) 
 
Another key role of governors is to performance manage those with operational responsibilities for the day 
to day running of the school – the delivery of the curriculum, maintenance of premises, safeguarding of 
children, and so forth.  The roll back of local government oversight and intervention has produced a 
regulatory gap and related concerns that some schools are failing to govern themselves properly.  Hence 
the importance of governors to central government at this time.  As functionaries of the state, governors 
are central to the formation of quasi-autonomous entities such as free schools and academies.  The day to 
day practices they undertake constitute vital relays for linking the formally autonomous operations of 
schools with the ‘public’ ambitions of government: 
 
By making us answer those questions and making sure that we have answers to those questions, 
they [governors] are having an impact.  And there’s no doubt for me the fact that I will have to 
explain things to the governors.  It does affect my work. (Christopher, Head teacher, Child’s Hill) 
 
I wouldn’t want the governing body to be directing my work, and dictating my work, or the school’s 
work, but you want them there as, you know, somebody to kind of like just remember you will 
have to explain this to me at some point. (Robert, Assistant Head teacher, Wingrave) 
 
In many ways governors today mirror the function of parastatal agents and bodies such as the school’s 
inspectorate, Ofsted: ‘They provide the information that will allow the state, the consumer or other parties 
– such as regulatory agencies – to assess the performance of these quasi-autonomous agencies, and hence 
govern them – evaluation, audit’ (Rose 1999: 147).  Governors open up schools to new grids of visibility and 
therefore cultivate the kinds of spaces and practices through which the internal operation of schools can 
be subject to new methods of scrutiny and control.  But in order for governors to successfully cultivate 
these specific arrangements, internal school processes must lend themselves to audit and measurement so 
that they be commensurated, ranked, sorted and graded by external evaluators.  Specific types of 
knowledge and skills are therefore privileged at this time – data mining and analysis, accountancy, 
performance evaluation and risk management in particular (Wilkins 2016).  Governors therefore find 
themselves engaged in the kinds of ‘corporate work’ where the ‘core business is educational outcomes’ 
(Wendy, Governance Manager, T-ALK, Sponsor of Richford) and ‘the only thing that really counts are the 
outcomes’ (Herman, Diocese Representative, Richford).  Corporatisation of school governance is also 
evident in the way that governors make explicit the connections between school governance and a business 
approach:  
 
So when you are a governor of a school you are basically running a business…And you’ve got to 
run something like that on a business-like basis.  Now it’s not a business but it has to be run in a 
business-like fashion.  (Alex, Vice Chair of Governors, Moorhead) 
 
I think going to, once you make that move as a school, to go to academy status, as a head teacher 
of that school it is quite daunting in the sense you are going into much more of a business.  (Liz, 
Assistant Head teacher, Canterbury) 
 
I’m not a curriculum person as such but the business of the school interests me…Well, pupils equals 
pounds, you’ve got to provide a first class education. (Dominic, Chair of Resources Committee, 
Ballard’s Wood) 
 
The legal and financial responsibilities underpinning academy conversion means that governors face 
pressures to rethink and revise traditional, ‘stakeholder’ models of school governance, once described to 
me as a ‘bums on seat’ culture.  The growth of disintermediation and decentralisation in the education 
system over the last five years means that central government now look to governors as enablers of reform 
on the ground and, more importantly, as agents willing and prepared to absorb the risks and insecurities 
once managed by local government: 
 
Well if you don’t perform in the private sector you lose your job typically…I think in my experience 
the private sector there’s less room for error.  And I think that forces a discipline and attention to 
detail, which is less prevalent in the public sector….One of the reasons why the academy concept 
came to play was this very idea of bringing private sector into this space.  (Sam, Deputy Chair of 
Governors, Richford) 
 
Just imagine yourself in business.  You’ve got a problem in business you can’t just slide home.  
You’ve got to sort it out.  You’ve got to sort out the balance sheet.  That’s gonna be an issue and 
things like that.  You can’t just assume that someone else is going to sort it out for you.  It’s not 
like that.  But that’s the price you pay for the additional responsibility. (Larry, LEA Governor, 
Wingrave) 
 
This has direct consequences for the types of people who get to enter governance roles.  Specifically, the 
types of people who are considered ‘fit for purpose’ at this time tend to be those with the skills and 
knowledge relevant to and generative of the conditions and materiality of devolved management: 
 
It would be an advantage to have, or in the finance sector, those kind of businessy-type skills.  They 
are quite invaluable as well I think when you are making those decisions and for someone to have 
that kind of knowledge.  (Liz, Associate Head teacher, Canterbury) 
 
I think she [the chair of governors] hopes that with the move to academy status that we can 
professionalise the governing body and move up a gear. (Mark, LEA Governor, Canterbury) 
 
Governing bodies at this time are also actively seeking people who are trained and skilled in the art of 
compliance monitoring, namely people who are familiar with bedrocking systems of scrutiny and control to 
future-proof the sustainability and integrity of organisations in the face of public investigation.  This includes 
the ritual undertaking of procedural imperatives and compliance-checking internal processes against 
targets set by regulatory bodies and statutory requirements and contractual obligations issued by 
government. 
 
So compliance is a big issue and ultimate responsibility, which is why it’s very important that the 
relationship between the governing body and the senior relationship team is a strong one because 
unless you are hearing everything you need to hear, you know, something could be going on that 
suddenly becomes a public issue, with potential media involvement, and you as a governing body 
say well we didn’t know this was happening. (Gregory, Foundation Governor, Child’s Hill) 
 
In their study of governing bodies, Deem, Brehony and Heath (1995) observed that it is difficult for 
governors to behave as ‘critical citizens’ (engage as political subjects with potentially conflicting interests 
and modes of participating) when they are conscripted to behave as ‘state volunteers’.   We might argue 
that today governors do more than the work of the state.  Under conditions of devolved management, the 
conduct of governors appears to be shaped by the logic of the market and the rationality of business.  The 
suggestion being that governors occupy a role that stands at the intersection of the state and the market. 
 
Corporate elitism? 
 
In this chapter I have briefly discussed the relationship between wider political trends affecting the English 
state school system at this time, namely disintermediation, depoliticisation and decentralisation, and 
related changes to the role and responsibilities of governors.  The rapid spread of devolved management 
across the English school system means that, in the absence of local government monitoring and oversight, 
governors have been spotlighted by central government as key to enhancing accountability, namely by 
opening up senior school leaders to greater forms of scrutiny and control.  As purveyors of corporate work, 
governors tend to be interpellated and organised as monitors/assessors/appraisers so that external 
regulators can be assured of the performance, legality and efficiency of the internal operations performed 
by senior school leaders. 
 
In some cases, governing bodies that were once made up of local, voluntary associations are being replaced 
by professionally-managed, trans-local organisations, such as academy sponsors.  In other cases, governing 
bodies are seeking guidance on how to reconstitute themselves in the image of corporate boards so they 
may adapt to the challenges of school autonomy on their own terms.  And in a small number of cases, some 
governing bodies appear to require little or no change to their practices because their existing approaches 
are sufficiently ‘modernised’ or ‘corporatised’ to meet the requirements of devolved management.  These 
trends indicate both the corporatisation of school governance and the hollowing out of democracy. 
 
Recently the Conservative government has attacked some of the normative preferences guiding school 
governance up until now (see GUK 2013, 2015), namely proportional representation and wider community 
participation where it does not contribute to smooth oversight of educational and financial performance.  
Opposition to a stakeholder model of school governance can be discerned among government and many 
quangos, private and third sector agencies (Stuart 2014) where it is framed in anachronistic terms as not fit 
for purpose, as something inappropriate, unwieldy and counter-productive to the tasks and responsibilities 
now facing governors.  Arguably this is true – democracy lends itself to possibilities of difference, 
deliberation and dissensus.  Not exactly complementary to discrete, technical practices and expert 
regulatory measures designed to ensure smooth bureaucratic administration and organisation.  Hence the 
dominant discourse now appears to favour a skills-based model of school governance, one that promotes 
conditional participation subject to skills and technocratic efficiency led by professionals, expert handlers 
and research people (Wilkins 2016).  As Leo et al. (2010: 77) argue, ‘Appointments [to the governing body] 
need not be based on any representational niceties or on any ideological links to local democracy’.  
However, we need to be aware that the desire to privatise decision making in this way has ideological links 
and implications of its own.  Consider that the appeal to neutral expert administration over politics serves 
to make school governance a microcosm for government regulation.  This is because, strategically, central 
government stands to gain more influence over the formation of schools where corporatisation and 
attendant concepts of ‘performance’ and ‘productivity’ predominate.  Politicised nominations to the 
governing body are not necessarily counter-productive to these aims.   But they certainly present a risk to 
disrupting and derailing what the government intends governors to be and do. 
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